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THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSING PROCESS
LICENSING OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
JOSEPH F. HENNESSEY*
In light of the growing demands upon dwindling supplies of traditional
sources of energy, it is manifest that alternative sources, particu-
larly nuclear power, must be developed if the United States is to achieve
its newly promulgated objective of energy independence. The Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC), which under the Atomic Energy Act of
1954' is responsible for licensing the construction and operation of
nuclear power plants, will play a major role in determining whether this
goal is realized in the reasonable future.
It would be difficult to overstate the importance to the United States
of nuclear power as a means of generating electricity. Although nuclear
power today accounts for approximately six percent of the nation's
electric energy production, that share is projected to reach more than
20 percent within a decade.2 The nuclear fuel consumed in production
of electrical power presently is the equivalent of 700,000 barrels of fuel
oil per day; by the early 1980's the equivalence is predicted to be
2,500,000 barrels daily.' Stressing the importance of nuclear power in
meeting the nation's energy objectives, the President stated in his Energy
Message of April 18, 1973: "Although our greatest dependence for
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2282 (1970).
2. Remarks by AEC Commissioner William 0. Doub, Planning Policy and Govern-
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energy until now has been on fossil fuels such as coal and oil, we must
not and we need not continue this heavy reliance in the future. The
major alternative to fossil fuel energy for the remainder of this century
is nuclear energy." 4
Absent dramatic technological developments in the next decade, the
objective of energy self-sufficiency will not be achieved unless the po-
tential of nuclear power is exploited fully. Realization of this potential
in a timeframe consistent with national needs will require decisive action
to eliminate or minimize the delays which until now have seriously
impeded nuclear power plant construction. At present, the average esti-
mated time from initiation of a nuclear power plant project until issu-
ance of an operating license is nine to ten years, about one-third longer
than the time required to begin generation from a fossil fuel plant.5
Although the causes of delay in nuclear plant construction are many and
varied, a factor receiving universal recognition is the AEC licensing
process. The importance of this problem, especially in the context of
the current energy crisis and the national commitment to environmental
preservation, was emphasized in the President's Energy Message of last
April:
The increasing occurrence of unnecessary delays in the develop-
ment of energy facilities must be ended if we are to meet our
energy needs. To be sure, reasonable safeguards must be vigor-
ously maintained for protection of the public and of our environ-
ment. Full public participation and questioning must also be
allowed as we decide where new energy facilities are to be built.
We need to streamline our procedures for licensing and inspec-
tions, reduce overlapping jurisdictions and eliminate confusion
generated by the Government.... During the coming year, we
will examine various possibilities to assure that all public and private
interests are impartially and expeditiously weighed in all Govern-
ment proceedings for permits, licensing and inspections.8
Concern about revision of existing procedures for licensing the con-
struction and operation of nuclear power plants emanates from repre-
sentatives of widely disparate interests. This Symposium is designed to
4. The President's Energy Message, Office of the White House Press Secretary,
Apr. 18, 1973.
5. Atomic Energy Commission, Report to the Director of Regulation by the Task
Force for the Study of the Reactor Licensing Process 14 (Dec. 1973).




identify aspects of the AEC licensing process which have contributed to
delay in nuclear power plant construction and operation and to examine,
from the viewpoints of several of the most significant of the concerned
interests, remedial measures which have been proposed or should be
considered. The objective is one of expediting the licensing process
without diminishing the efficacy of AEC review of public safety and
environmental considerations and without prejudicing adequate oppor-
tunity for public participation with respect to matters of legitimate
public concern.
THE AEC LICENSING PRocEss
In addition to its responsibilities for managing a major industrial en-
terprise, conducting a massive research and development effort, and
manufacturing the nation's nuclear armaments," the AEC has exclusive
jurisdiction, from the standpoint of radiological health and safety and
the national defense and security, over the regulation of nuclear power
plants, including the issuance of licenses for the construction and opera-
tion of such plants." At the outset of the industrial development of
atomic energy, the Commission recognized the ambivalence of its posi-
tion as developer as well as regulator of the nuclear power industry, a
factor which in recent years has become a focal point for public criti-
cism and congressional concern. In response to this concern, the position
of Director of Regulation was established in an attempt to minimize
the conflicting nature of the Commission's statutory duties. Reporting
directly to the Commission, the Director is independent of the AEC
General Manager and is vested with the responsibility for supervising
the agency's licensing and other regulatory functions.'
The licensing process begins with the filing of an application for a
facility construction permit.10 Requiring several volumes of information,
the application includes a detailed preliminary safety analysis report
and an environmental impact report. The AEC staff reviews in depth
the safety analysis, obtains any needed additional information, and
resolves with the applicant's assistance any remaining questions con-
cerning the safety and environmental impact of the proposed plant.
Concurrently, the staff prepares and publishes its own independent draft
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2140 (1970).
8. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aft'd,
405 US. 1035 (1972).
9. 10 C.F.R. § 1.12 (1973).
10. Id. S 50.23.
1974]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
environmental impact statement and obtains government agency and
public comment in compliance with the National Environment Policy
Act of 1969.11
Late in the staff review process, the application is submitted to the
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), an independent
statutory body composed of as many as 15 members representing a
variety of scientific and technical disciplines. After an informal hearing
at which both the applicant and staff are questioned on critical issues,
the ACRS submits to the Commission its report, which, under the
Atomic Energy Act, becomes a part of the applicant's record. 2
After the staff's safety analysis is completed and the ACRS report
submitted, a formal public hearing under the Administrative Procedure
Act' 3 is held before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB).
The ASLB consists of three individuals and is chaired by an attorney,
the other two members usually possessing technical backgrounds. 4
Although only the opportunity for a public hearing is required for
operating licenses, the hearing is mandatory in the case of construction
permits.' The ASLB hearings are adjudicatory and culminate in an
initial decision by the Board to approve, deny, or approve with condi-
tions the requested license.
An appeal from an ASLB decision may be taken to the Commission.
The Commission, however, has delegated its full appellate authority to
a three-member Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board1" in an
effort to give added credibility to the agency's licensing decisions. The
delegation, pursuant to which the Appeal Board has authority to affirm,
reverse, or remand decisions of the ASLB, was designed to remove
any possibility of public concern that licensing decisions are prejudiced
by the Commission's responsibilities for development of the nuclear
industry. Although Appeal Board decisions ordinarily are final, the
Commission has retained the power to review, on a sua sponte basis,
decisions in limited areas of major significance.' 7 Otherwise, decisions
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2232(b) (1970).
13. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
15. Id. § 2239.
16. 10 C.F.R. § 2.785 (1973).
17. Id. § 2.786.
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of the Appeal Board are subject to judicial review under the provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act 8 and the Hobbs Act.'"
During the course of plant construction, a similar process is followed
with respect to issuance of the further license required before the plant
may be placed into operation. At this stage the staff and ACRS con-
centrate primarily on operating problems and questions that may have
been left unresolved at the construction permit stage. An ASLB hearing
is required on an operating license only when it is requested by a
person whose interest may be affected by issuance of the license.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO LICENSING DELAY
Delays in the licensing process can be traced to a number of causes.
Some relate to the type of reactor plant purchased by the utility and to
the quality of the input provided by the manufacturer and the architect-
engineer, as well as the utility, in preparation of the permit application.
Early nuclear power plants evidenced marked dissimilarities reflecting
not only differences in the plant designs of various manufacturers but
also periodic design alterations necessitated by improved technology.
For the AEC, each application for a construction permit proposing a
new plant design required a complete and thorough staff analysis. The
burden on the staff was exacerbated by the many inadequate or incom-
plete applications prepared hastily in attempts to establish priority on
the AEC docket. As a result, a typical license file was crowded with
correspondence from the staff to the applicant seeking additional infor-
mation, together with dozens of amendments required by the staff
before it was satisfied with the adequacy of the presentation in the
application. The amendment process alone frequently consumed a year
or more of the staff's time.
As plant designs have become more standardized and second and third
plants have been proposed for existing plant sites, questions have arisen
concerning the necessity of review by the ACRS of proposed plants
presenting no substantial safety problems not previously evaluated fully.
If the ACRS could be relieved of its statutory review responsibility in
such cases, the time for processing applications could be reduced by two
to three months and the ACRS would be able to devote more time to
cases warranting more complete review. Since, however, the responsi-
bilities of the ACRS are imposed by statute, implementation of this
proposal would require an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act.
18. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970).
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2353 (1970).
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In recent years clearly the most significant cause of delay in the
licensing process has been the proliferation of issues raised in a growing
number of interventions by private individuals and public interest or-
ganizations, particularly those dedicated to protecting the environment.
Until 1970, the only issues raised in AEC licensing cases were those
relating to radiological health and safety. The effectiveness of controls
designed to guard against the release, operational or accidental, of radio-
active effluents from nuclear plants, together with issues concerning the
common defense and security, were of primary concern. Interventions
based on nuclear safety considerations were rare, probably because the
new nuclear technology was complex and there were few independent
scientists and technicians willing and able to challenge the findings of
the nuclear "establishment." In the relatively small number of cases in
which intervention was attempted, the proposed issues generally in-
volved non-nuclear matters, such as the effects of heated water effluents,
or matters of broad public policy, such as the rights of small utility
systems to share in the benefits of nuclear power plants being con-
structed by the larger utilities. During this period the AEC consistently
maintained that its jurisdiction under the Atomic Energy Act did not
extend to non-nuclear effects of nuclear facilities and that, unlike most
regulatory agencies, it was not empowered to decide broad public policy
issues.2 0
In 1970 two legislative enactments expanded substantially the number
and type of issues which could be raised in the licensing process. The
AEC was affected most by the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), which directed all federal agencies to establish procedures
which would ensure that environmental amenities and values are "given
appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and
technical considerations." 22 The requirement under NEPA that an
environmental impact statement be prepared prior to the approval of any
major federal project enlarged the scope of the AEC licensing process
to include such matters as air, noise, and water pollution, ecological
effects, aesthetics, sociological and cultural impacts, the need to preserve
historical sites, and the necessity for a systematic balancing of environ-
mental costs against the economic and social benefits of a project.
20. This position was upheld by several appellate courts. See, e.g., Cities of States-
ville v. AEG, 441 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1969); New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170
(lst Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969).
21. 42 U.S.C. §5 4321-4347 (1970).
22. Id. 5 4332(b).
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In addition, Congress in 1970 amended section 105 of the Atomic
Energy Act2 3 to require review of antitrust aspects of any application
for a nuclear power plant license. Initial review is by the Department
of Justice; thereafter, if recommended by the Antitrust Division or re-
quested by an affected party, the AEC must conduct a hearing on anti-
trust matters. The purpose of the amendment was to provide a forum
in which the smaller utilities could assert their right to participate
equitably in the benefits of large nuclear plants.2
The impact of NEPA on the AEC and its licensing process was dev-
astating. The Commission adopted an interim statement of policy in
implementation of NEPA, based upon its interpretation of its responsi-
bilities in light of other environmental legislation and its concern that
development of capacity to meet the nation's energy requirements not
be unduly delayed." The policy was intended as a transition measure
until full compliance with NEPA could be accomplished in orderly
fashion without endangering the nation s energy objectives.
Because of the obviously severe environmental impact of nuclear
power plants, it is not surprising that the AEC's mandatory public
hearings provided a ready public forum for the trial of issues involving
the precise scope of NEPA's broad and imprecise directives. The AEC's
interim policy statement was attacked by environmental intervenors in
a number of cases on the grounds that it fell short of adequate com-
pliance and that NEPA afforded no room for transitional measures
providing less than complete and immediate compliance. When the
intervenors' position was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in a landmark decision in Calvert Cliffs' Coordi-
tratflg Conmmiittee v. AEC,20 the Commission was compelled to revise
completely its NEPA policies and procedures and to reorganize and
supplement its regulatory staff to meet its responsibilities under the
decision.27 As a result, more than 17 months elapsed without issuance
of a nuclear power plant construction permit or operating license.
In recent years, serious questions of nuclear safety have begun to take
their proper place in license hearings. In large part, this new activity
reflects the AEC's acquisition of an increasing fund of technical knowl-
23. 42 U.S.C. S 2135 (1970).
24. See S. REP. No. 91-2147, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
25. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix D (1973).
26. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
27. Appendix D of 10 C.F.R. Part 50 was revised September 9, 1971 (36 Fed. Reg.
18071-72) and amended on several subsequent occasions, most significantly June 15, 1972
(37 Fed. Reg. 11874).
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edge resulting from ongoing safety research efforts and studied ex-
perience in the operation of licensed plants, as well as the broad availa-
bility of this information to the technical community and the public.
The safety problems so identified have tended to become issues in li-
cense proceedings, with protracted hearings being necessary to examine
the same complex issues in separate cases involving different reactors and
applicants.
Much of the delay at the hearing stage has been due to the tactics
employed by the adversary parties and their counsel. The new environ-
mental issues and the rekindled interest in safety questions have brought
to the AEC hearings the extensive resources of national environmental
and public interest organizations employed in challenging particular
aspects of a proposed plant or in opposing the growth of nuclear power
in general. These organizations have been able to enlist the services of
a number of highly capable and experienced trial attorneys, many of
whom are dedicated to the representation of the public interest. The
confrontation between intervenors' counsel and the equally qualified
attorneys for applicants and the AEC staff has introduced into AEC
hearings all the legal tactics and techniques which characterize pro-
longed litigation in the courts. It is customary for intervenors not only
to raise a plethora of issues at the outset to maximize their opportunity
for success but also to resist efforts by the hearing board to eliminate
issues of questionable validity in prehearing conferences. The tech-
niques of discovery are fully used to extract from the applicant and the
staff information not otherwise available that will lend support to an
intervenor's position. Although discovery may be considered a "fishing
expedition" by the applicant and the staff, it is viewed by the inter-
venor's counsel as a perfectly legitimate effort to obtain relevant infor-
mation which the AEC voluntarily should have made available to the
public.
Disputes over the production of documents have caused weeks and
even months of delay in license hearings. Controversy in early cases
was exacerbated by the AEC's restrictive disclosure policy which in-
terpreted the Freedom of Information Act 8 as exempting all internal
staff documents from requirements of public disclosure. The disputes
and resultant delays have diminished as the Commission has gradually
revised its policies to permit disclosure of virtually all internal staff
documents.2 9
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
29. 10 C.F.R. § 2.744 (1973).
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The "paper" battle continues unabated, however, with respect to
documents which the applicant or the plant manufacturer classifies as
"proprietary data," since the Commission's rules protect proprietary
information from public disclosure." Obviously, in certain situations
relevant and sometimes essential information can be found in technical
documents revealing trade secrets and technical "know-how" of con-
siderable significance to the competitive position of the manufacturer.
Hearing boards have attempted, without much success, to devise ac-
ceptable compromises, such as in camera examination, disclosure to
counsel on a confidential basis, and off-the-record consideration. Con-
flicts continue to arise, nevertheless, over questions of proprietary status,
the need for the evidence, the balancing of the interests involved, the
appropriateness of confidentiality agreements, and the method by which
evidence will be introduced and its status, once admitted.3
The examination of technical witnesses in contested license hearings
has been extensive, frequently repetitive, and always time consuming.
To some extent, the lack of an adequate number of qualified individuals
to present adversary technical testimony has necessitated efforts by
intervenor attorneys to extract supporting evidence from technical
witnesses for the applicant and staff through vigorous and broad-
ranging cross examination. The impact of this tactic has often been
heightened by the permissive attitude adopted by many of the hearing
boards towards the conduct and scope of cross examination.
Delay becomes most costly and painful to a utility when a plant has
been substantially completed but is unable to become operative because
of adversary proceedings on the operating license. The Atomic Energy
Act mandates an opportunity for a public hearing at the operating
license stage upon the request of any person whose interest may be
affected. Hearings have been required in the vast majority of recent
cases, in many instances as a result of controversies concerning environ-
mental and safety issues which remained unresolved following review
of the construction permit application. Recent initiatives by the Com-
mission designed to resolve all substantial issues at an earlier stage in
the licensing process are likely to call into question the need for ad-
judicatory hearings at the operating stage. The exigencies of the na-
tional energy problem should lend further impetus and urgency to the
30. Id. § 2.790.
31. On November 15, 1973, the AEC announced that it was considering a number
of alternative amendments to 10 C.F.R. § 2790 (1973) with respect to the availability of
proprietary information. 38 Fed. Reg. 31543 (Nov. 15, 1973).
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elimination of this most troublesome cause of delay-most troublesome,
that is, in terms of the immediacy of its impact on energy supply.
AEC ACTIONS TO IMPROVE THE LICENSING PROCESS
In what appears to be a determined and concerted effort to attack
the problem of licensing delays, characterized in the President's Energy
Message as "unreasonable," the AEC either has taken or is considering
a number of impressive steps calculated to reduce the overall project
time for nuclear plants by as much as two years immediately and eventu-
ally by as much as four years. The first step taken was directed against
the practice of filing applications prepared hastily and inadequately
merely to establish precedence on the AEC docket. A revision of Com-
mission procedures now requires that an application, including the appli-
cant's safety analysis and environmental report, be submitted for a
prefiling staff review of its adequacy.82 Only when the staff is satisfied
as to quality and completeness is the application placed on the docket.
This step properly places the responsibility for development of adequate
information upon the utility and its contractors, rather than leaving it
to the time-consuming process of staff inquiries and amendments to the
license application. Although this might be viewed as an artificial device
to shorten the AEC staff review time, it almost certainly will result
in improved engineering effort at the preapplication stage and produce
real time savings.
The single AEC initiative which is central to achieving the overall
acceleration objective is the concept of plant design standardization. The
Commission's policy endorsing standardization, adopted in March 197 3,aa
was based upon the conviction that continuing changes in plant design
with concurrent escalation in plant capacity had been a major cause
of delay and that the continuation of such practices would present
insuperable problems in light of the massive increase in the number of
nuclear plants predicted for the balance of the century.
The AEC policy statement prescribed three standardization options
which it was prepared to introduce into the licensing process. The first
is the "reference system" approach, which contemplates the submission
of standardized plant designs for AEC regulatory review. Once the
design is approved, a utility can concentrate its attention on site-related
32. 10 C.F.R. § 2.101 (1973).
S3. Atomic Energy Commission, Statement on Methods for Achieving Standardiza-
tion of Nuclear Power Plants (Mar. 5, 1973).
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questions and simply incorporate the approved standard design by refer-
ence into its application. All major reactor manufacturers have sub-
mitted or are planning to submit reference designs for approval. Under
the second option, the "duplicate plant" approach, the Commission will
conduct a single review when a utility or group of utilities plans to locate
identical plants at different sites. This option has already been selected
by a number of utilities in their planning for future construction. The
third option involves issuance of a "license to manufacture" authorizing
a manufacturer to build a number of reactor plants at one central lo-
cation and to move them to a number of different sites for installation
and operation. 34 A typical application of this option is the proposal of
Offshore Power Systems, Inc., to manufacture eight floating nuclear
plants to be placed at offshore locations.35 The efficacy of this approach
as a time conserver has been questioned, since it will be necessary
to obtain three, rather than two, licenses before a plant can become
operative. Nevertheless, it would appear that a single license review of
plant design, with individual utility license reviews limited to site-
related matters, should reduce future plant lead-times, conserve technical
manpower, and actually enhance safety.
If a utility pursues one of the standardization options, questions of
siting and site-related impacts become predominant in the license hearing
process. Siting questions have already gained considerable importance
and emphasis as a result of the introduction of environmental considera-
tions into the hearing process. Soon after the Calvert Cliffs' decision,
the AEC recognized the need for, and the feasibility of, the considera-
tion of non-nuclear environmental issues at an earlier stage in the
licensing process prior to completion of the more complex studies of
nuclear safety considerations. Accordingly, procedures were revised to
provide for conferences and hearings at a relatively early stage in the
licensing process.36 Whether these initiatives will accomplish their
objective of avoiding delays by the consideration of independent problem
areas in timely stages or will only compound the problem by prolonging
the hearing process is not yet clear. It is manifest, however, that the
identification and resolution of non-nuclear issues should be attempted
before the final stages of licensing.
34. The AEC on November 2, 1973, published amendments to its regulations, adding
a new Subpart E to 10 C.F.R. Part 2 and a new Appendix M to 10 C.F.R. Part 50. The
amendments established procedures for licensing the manufacture of nuclear reactors
to be operated at designated sites. 38 Fed. Reg. 30251 (Nov. 2, 1973).
35. 38 Fed. Reg. 34008 (Dec. 10, 1973).
36. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A (1973).
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Some initial steps have been taken to substitute rulemaking procedures
for the repetitious treatment of generic nuclear safety problems in inde-
pendent license hearings. Logically, the rulemaking approach to generic
problems would appear to be one auspicious method of removing im-
portant and extremely complex safety issues from a trial-like atmosphere
with its attendant unpredictability, instead treating them in a technically
oriented forum where consideration would be more reasoned and less
emotional. Nevertheless, the AEC's actual experience in the rulemaking
proceedings it instituted in the matters of emergency core cooling
systems for reactors and the permissible level of radioactive effluents
from nuclear plants has failed to support this premise. The Commission's
decision to employ adversary procedures in these proceedings has simply
introduced into the rulemaking forum all the legal technicalities and
frustrations which characterize the adjudicatory process. As a result,
each of these proceedings involved about two years of controversial
hearings and deliberations and an unjustified expenditure of technical
and professional effort. New approaches will clearly be needed if
generic rulemaking is to be a viable alternative. The difficult problem,
of course, is to determine the extent to which public participation in
the rulemaking process is required for a rule to withstand challenges
to its validity in subsequent individual license proceedings.
FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS PROPOSED
The AEC on March 8, 1974, submitted to Congress proposed legisla-
tive amendments intended to eliminate some of the causes of delay in
the nuclear plant licensing process.3T Among the most significant pro-
posals is the suggested amendment of the Atomic Energy Act to elimi-
nate the mandatory requirement for review by the ACRS of each
application for a construction permit or operating license. With the
growing trend towards standardization and repetitive construction at a
single site, it would seem timely to require ACRS review only when the
AEC or the ACRS itself considers that such review is necessary.
Another proposal by the AEC involves elimination, in many cases, of
the statutory requirement for an opportunity for public hearing at the
operating license stage. Again, standardization of design and early and
comprehensive determination of environmental issues at the construction
permit stage should accommodate a procedure that would call for oper-
37. For a description of the proposed legislation, see Shapar & Malseh, Proposed
Changes in the Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Process: The Choice of Putting a Finger
in the Dike or Building a New Dike, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 539 (1974).
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ating license hearings only when required to decide substantial new or
unresolved safety and environmental issues. There should be sufficient
confidence in the AEC regulatory staff to rely upon it to represent ade-
quately the public interest in the resolution of less substantial matters.
The extraordinary safety record compiled by the nuclear power industry
should be sufficient indication that such confidence is justified.
Other suggested new approaches may be somewhat more contro-
versial. One such proposal is to couple a standardized plant design with
a preapproved site.38 This approach, which the AEC estimates would
reduce the project period by as much as four years, contemplates a bank
of sites approved in advance as suitable for construction of plants with
specific characteristics; the only question remaining on a specific license
application would be whether the standard plant's previously approved
design characteristics fall within the parameters assumed in approval of
the site. Such an approach obviously would place considerable burdens
on a potential intervenor. To pose an effective opposition, he would be
compelled to present separate objections to a standard reactor design
and a plant site which would be in present and perhaps permanent isola-
tion from each other, or risk the alternative of opposing issuance of a
construction permit when practically no issue remained to contest.
AEC Commissioner Doub has proposed3 9 that the Commission con-
sider a policy change which could have an immediate effect in expediting
the start of new plant construction. Prior to the enactment of NEPA,
Commission policy permitted site clearing, excavation, and some founda-
tion work at a construction site prior to issuance of a construction
permit. Following the Calvert Cliffs' decision, however, the AEC
reduced drastically the scope of authorized prepermit construction ac-
tivity.40 The natural result has been a delay of many months in the
construction of greatly needed new nuclear power plants. Commis-
sioner Doub now suggests that, in light of emergency exceptions from
the environmental laws being approved for energy sources, it is timely
that the AEC also consider some relaxation in its prohibitions. Ex-
emptions would be granted only after satisfactory completion of the
staff's environmental review and public hearing on any environmental
issues. Notwithstanding the explicit recognition in the proposal of the
need for prior consideration of environmental issues and compliance
38. See Address by AEC Commissioner William 0. Doub, Atomic Industrial Forum
Annual Conference, San Francisco, Calif., Nov. 12, 1973.
39. Id.
40. 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.10(c)-(d) (1973).
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with the procedural requirements of NEPA, objections may be expected
from proponents of full and uncompromising adherence to NEPA
principles.
It is widely recognized that the delay problem in the hearing process
can be attributed largely to the complex technical nature of the subject
matter. This fact has led a number of knowledgeable people repre-
senting the interests of intervenors as well as applicants to suggest
seriously that public hearings be eliminated from the licensing pro-
cedures. Their position is that resolution of the serious problems of
reactor safety should be taken away from the lawyers and given back
to the technical community, which is best equipped to give these prob-
lems the high quality conservative technical analysis and professional
decisionmaking demanded by the complex nature of the subject matter.
It is apparent that any new approach determined to be necessary or
desirable must find public acceptance if the objective of expediting
a substantially enlarged nuclear power capability is to be achieved.
Commissioner Doub recently characterized the AEC's primary objec-
tive for the future as "achieving a high level of acceptability for an
improving technology which has been and is being tested in the
crucible of experience." 41 He concludes that public acceptance of
nuclear power has been enhanced by the process of public hearings
and interventions. Controversies and contested hearings, with the con-
comitant exposure of facts concerning nuclear technology, clearly have
a significant positive impact on public attitudes. These considerations
should weigh heavily in the evaluation of any proposal to dispense with
public hearings.
One step which could add immeasurably to the level of public confi-
dence in the nuclear licensing system is the prospective enactment of
legislation separating the regulatory functions of the AEC from its other
functions and establishing a Nuclear Energy Commission as an independ-
ent agency.42 Despite the efforts by the AEC to divorce the Commis-
sioners and promotional staff from licensing functions, the public
impression has persisted that impartial and unbiased decisions cannot be
expected from an agency with dual and conflicting responsibilities. The
41. Address by AEC Commissioner William 0. Doub, Atomic Industrial Forum
Annual Conference, San Francisco, Calif., Nov. 12, 1973.
42. ILR. 11510, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), a bill to establish an Energy Research
and Development Administration and to transfer the licensing and regulatory functions
of the AEC to a new Nuclear Energy Commission, was passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives December 19, 1973, and is in the process of hearings before the Senate Gov-
ernment Operations Committee.
[Vol. 15:487
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proposed legislation could dispel this persistent lack of confidence. More
importantly, however, there would be established a new regulatory
agency with the sole responsibility of regulating the nuclear industry
and which could direct its energies entirely to the resolution of the
problems of licensing delays in nuclear plant construction.
